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Hermeneutics or Mathematics?
Two Ways of Thinking Plurality Today.
Gert-Jan van der Heiden
Against a strand of thought represented, among 
others, by Heidegger, Blanchot, Derrida, Deleuze, 
and Nancy, Badiou argues that the true Greek event 
of philosophy is the interruption of both the poem 
and the myth by the invention of the matheme. 
Thus, Badiou argues that philosophy is mathemat-
ical in nature. This leads to the following question: 
What happens in Badiou’s decision for mathemat-
ics and does this decision indeed lead to a funda-
mentally different account of the plurality of being 
than a poetic one? In this paper I intend to confront 
Badiou’s ontology with a more poetically orient-
ed ontology that develops a conception of the plu-
rality of being as well. The work of Jean-Luc Nancy 
seems to be a natural starting point for such a task. 
His work is poetically oriented and his work is ex-
plicitly concerned with developing an ontology of 
plurality. In this essay, I set the stage for an argu-
mentative confrontation between the mathemat-
ical and the poetical orientation of philosophy in 
terms of a confrontation between Badiou’s math-
ematical and Nancy’s poetic-hermeneutic concep-
tion of plurality.
BADIOU NANCY MATHEMATICS HERMENEUTICS PLURALITY
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When Badiou develops his idea that mathematics is a science of being qua being, he does so in continual discussion 
with Heidegger. 1 This choice for Heidegger serves 
Badiou’s polemics in L’être et l’événement (1988), in 
which Heidegger is brought into play as the exem-
plary representative of a philosophy that takes po-
etics as its guideline. As Badiou writes elsewhere, 
Heidegger represents a strand of thought that has 
«put philosophy in the hands of the poem» (Badiou 
1999, 66, 70), a strand of thought represented by Blanchot, Derrida, Deleuze, 
Lacoue-Labarthe, and Nancy. According to Badiou, the alternative to this poet-
ic orientation in philosophy is a mathematical one and these two different ori-
entations are as old as philosophy (Badiou 1988, 143). As Badiou remarks «que 
la pensée absolument originaire se meut dans le poétique» (ibid.). Hence, a real 
debate on the nature of philosophy is at stake in the discussion between po-
etic and mathematical thought. In fact, one might even see a certain symme-
try in these two orientations: Badiou criticizes the poetic strands of thought 
for having sutured philosophy to poetics and thus forgetting to connect phi-
losophy to its other conditions, such as science, politics and love. However, as 
Badiou’s critics wonder, does the mathematical ori-
entation not suture philosophy to mathematics? 2 In 
L’être et l’événement, this latter question is affirmed 
by the remark Badiou makes immediately after his 
acknowledgment of the two orientations of philos-
ophy. Here, he argues that the true Greek event of 
philosophy is the interruption of both the poem and 
the myth by the invention of the matheme (Badiou 
1988, 144). Thus, Badiou argues that philosophy is 
mathematical in nature. This leads to the follow-
ing question: What happens in Badiou’s decision for 
mathematics and does this decision indeed lead to 
a fundamentally different account of the plurality of 
being than a poetic one? 
To be able to address these questions, it is 
necessary to confront Badiou’s ontology with a more 
poetically oriented ontology that develops a con-
ception of the plurality of being as well. The work of Jean-Luc Nancy seems to be 
a natural starting point for such a task. His work is poetically oriented and be-
longs to the Heideggerian strands of thought. Moreover, his work is explicitly 
concerned with developing an ontology of plurality. Finally, in Nancy’s Le part-
age des voix (1982), it is clear that the relation between his conception of plural-
ity and poetics is not vague or arbitrary, but rather concerns the very heart of his 
concept of partage that forms the heart of his account of plurality. 
In this essay, I set the stage for an argumentative confrontation between 
the mathematical and the poetical orientation of philosophy in terms of a con-
frontation between Badiou’s mathematical and Nancy’s poetic-hermeneutic con-
ception of plurality. Such a confrontation does not only allow us to understand 
more carefully what Badiou’s critique of poetic thought consists it and what is at 
stake in the debate between mathematics and hermeneutics, but it will also allow 
me to show which dimensions of plurality Badiou is unable to think and which po-
1 A more elaborate account of the 
ideas expressed in this essay as 
well as a further positioning of the 
work of Badiou and Nancy in the 
framework of other contemporary 
accounts of ontology may be found 
in van der Heiden (2014), espe-
cially in the first three chapters.
2 Badiou 1999, 60. According to 
Noys (2003, 128), these critics for-
get that philosophy is not equat-
ed with mathematics. Although 
this distinction between philos-
ophy and mathematics is clear-
ly due to Badiou, it is also clear 
that his account of both plurali-
ty and thought is derived from his 
conception of what mathematics 
is. In fact, it is mathematics from 
which Badiou derives his specif-
ic conception of concepts such 
as choice, the operation of fidel-
ity and forcing. At any rate, in re-
lation to this criticism, one has 
to deal with the double status of 
mathematics as «the discourse 
of ontology» and as «one subjec-
tive condition among others» (cfr. 
Bosteels 2001, 200-229, footnote 15).
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etic-hermeneutic elements still play a role in his thought. In the first section, I will 
discuss Badiou’s critique of poetically oriented philosophies and of hermeneutics. 
In this way, I will be able to identify the main themes Badiou criticizes under the 
heading of poetic thought and hermeneutics. In the second section, I will bring 
Nancy’s conception of hermeneutics into play in order to show to what extent 
this conception can and cannot answer Badiou’s criticisms and to which concep-
tion of plurality such a poetic-hermeneutic approach leads. Moreover, in this sec-
tion, I will reassess some of the poetic-hermeneutic elements from Badiou’s work. 
In the third section, I will make a few concluding remarks on the platonic tradition 
to which both models of plurality claim to belong. 
1. Badiou’s Critique of Poetic-Hermeneutic Thought 
Badiou’s account of the poetic orientation of philosophy concerns first and fore-
most the hermeneutic-phenomenological philosophies of the 20th century. Of 
course, it remains to be seen to what extent his points of critique can be applied 
in their generality to a diversity of oeuvres. Therefore, I will assess three major 
points of critique: (1) subtraction; (2) plurality without measure; (3) meaning 
versus truth. 
1.1. Subtraction
Let us begin with the most difficult and abstract issue that Badiou takes up in 
his critique of Heidegger. It concerns the issue of truth as alētheia or uncon-
cealment (Unverborgenheit) that describes a phe-
nomenological access to being. 3 Heidegger always 
thinks the disclosure of being in relation to a more 
primordial withdrawal (Entzug) of being. Because of 
this withdrawal, being itself can never be brought 
to presence completely. Yet, this emphasis on the withdrawal of being as the 
source from which the unconcealment of being arises, indicates according to 
Badiou that Heidegger’s and similar (hermeneutic) phenomenologies aim to pro-
vide an intuition of the nothing that is being, thus offering «un trajet de proxim-
ité» to approach and experience being as close as possible. Apparently, despite 
the withdrawal of being, these phenomenologies still aim to do the impossible 
and come as close to being as possible. According to Badiou, it is typical for po-
etic thought to search for nothingness in the sense of trying to intuit and draw 
close to being (Badiou 1988, 67).
This problematization of nothingness does not imply that the notion of 
nothingness would not play any role in Badiou’s thought. In fact, his account of 
the void as the name of being clearly shows that he embraces his own version 
of Heidegger’s ontic-ontological difference in which being is nothingness. Yet, 
philosophy’s relation to the void should not be accounted for in terms of a with-
drawal that nevertheless still provides something to experience, but rather in 
terms of subtraction: being is subtracted from any presentation, i.e., it is not pre-
sented itself since it is presentation itself. Hence, one might say that Badiou rad-
icalizes the in-access to being. 
Heidegger’s withdrawal of being is approached in light of the poetic ef-
fort to provide an experience of and with being. This means that poetic thought 
moves from the index of being to an experience of what is indexed, namely be-
3 Elsewhere I have shown to what 
extent this problematic itself can 
be seen as a Heideggerian heritage, 
cf. van der Heiden (2012, 115-131).
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ing. Mathematical thought, on the other hand, does not proceed by presenting 
the unpresentable. By radicalizing the inaccessibility of being, thought receives 
a different direction. Rather than trying to overcome the subtraction of being 
by moving back to its origin, mathematical thought moves in the other direc-
tion, namely in the direction of consequences of a decision. To understand this, 
one should consider the role played by axioms in mathematics. Axioms are the 
starting point of mathematics that are not grounded in any experience (of be-
ing). Therefore, their introduction should be thought 
as a decision and as an intervention. 4 Subsequently, 
the work of the mathematician is a form of fidelity—a 
deductive fidelity—that draws the consequences of 
these decisions. This structure is applied to ontolo-
gy, as Badiou (1988, 67) emphasizes: «Toute saisie 
de l’être suppose, quant à l’existence, une décision 
qui, sans garantie ni arbitrage, oriente décisivement 
la pensée». 
1.2. Plurality without Measure
The second theme in Badiou’s critique of the poet-
ic-hermeneutic philosophies concerns a more direct 
criticism of hermeneutics in its more classical sense, 
as developed by philosophers such as Gadamer and 
Ricoeur. This critique concerns in the first place the 
type of plurality that is thinkable in classical herme-
neutics. To see this, consider e.g. Ricoeur’s account 
of the plurality of interpretations as offered in Le 
conflit des interprétations (1969). 
Ricoeur argues here that different practic-
es of interpretations exist providing us with different and even mutually con-
flicting interpretations of (the meaning of) being and human existence in par-
ticular. Yet, since being is one, a hermeneutic ontology cannot simply end up its 
inquiry with such a multiplicity of conflicting interpretations since every inquiry 
into the meaning of existence is regulated by this unity of being (Ricoeur 1969, 
23). The regulative idea of the unity of being, implies that these conflicting con-
ceptions of being should be understood as different aspects of one human exist-
ence that demand a «figure cohérente de l’être» (Ricoeur 1969, 27). 
It is exactly this latter aspect of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic ontology to 
which Badiou protests. He does so for two obvious reasons. 
(1) Primacy of multiplicity. In the first place, he proposes a conception 
of being in which plurality precedes unity. In his reading of Plato’s Parmenides, 
Badiou notices that the Greek pair of the one (hen) and the many (polla) ulti-
mately privileges the one. Reading Badiou’s remark on the conflict of interpre-
tations in light of this pair, we see that for him Ricoeur’s account of the plu-
rality of interpretations is just a variation of the many as polla. Consequently, 
Ricoeur develops a hermeneutic ontology that remains within the boundaries 
of the hen-polla distinction. Yet, the Parmenides also introduces a notion of plu-
rality that transcends this distinction, namely the notion of plēthos. This notion, 
which Badiou prefers to translate as «multiplicité» to distinguish it from polla or 
«pluralité», appears only under the hypothesis that the one is not (Badiou 1988, 
4 Badiou (1988, 226) describes 
the intervention as follows: 
«L’intervention a pour operation 
initiale de faire nom d’un élément 
imprésenté du site pour qualifi-
er l’événement dont ce site est le 
site». Clearly, with this emphasis 
on decision, also the realm of faith, 
conviction and even religion come 
into play at the heart of thought. 
This is clearly visible in Badiou’s 
book on Saint Paul (1997, 15-17). 
Note also what Derrida (2000, 88) 
writes on the notion of the axiom: 
«Un axiome affirme toujours, son 
nom l’indique, une valeur, un prix; 
il confirme ou promet une evalua-
tion qui doit rester intact et donner 
lieu, comme toute valeur, à un acte 
de foi». Derrida relates this no-
tion to the problematic of the holy 
and the sacred. In fact, according 
to him, the problem of the axiom 
gives rise to the very connected-
ness of the two sources of religion 
which he locates in the holy - the 
intact - and in belief - the act or 
confession of faith (acte de foi) to 
which the intact should give rise.
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45). 5 Hence, (Ricoeur’s) hermeneutics would only al-
low for plurality and not for multiplicity in Badiou’s 
sense of the word. 
Of course, it remains to be seen to what extent this focus on a plurali-
ty that is guided by oneness is typical for all forms of hermeneutics and poetic 
thought. In fact, as I will suggest in one of the following sections, Nancy’s rein-
terpretation of hermeneutics exactly challenges the same element in Ricoeur’s 
thought as Badiou does in order to develop a poetic conception of a plurality that 
is not subsumed under oneness.  
(2) Multiplicity and decision. In the second place, Badiou criticizes her-
meneutics for conceiving of the conflict of interpretations as a conflict that can 
be resolved in a form of consensus. Clearly, both the possibility and the require-
ment of such a consensus is founded in the fact that the many interpretations 
concern a shared existence. However, Badiou does not accept this presupposi-
tion of (Ricoeur’s) hermeneutics; existence is not the primary given to which all 
practices of interpretation respond. Rather, one must first decide on what counts 
as existing, as he puts it in Court traité (1998), and this decision orients thought 
(Badiou 1998, 52). The conflict between conceptions of being is not secondary to 
a primary givenness of being, but it is primary since the decision on what counts 
and what does not count as being determines the orientation of every philosoph-
ical thinking on being. Hence, the issue that Badiou takes up with hermeneutics 
concerns the question of what discloses a particular orientation in thought: de-
cision or a previous givenness. 
Also with respect to this second element in Badiou’s critique of Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics, it is important to note, anticipating the next section, that it is ex-
actly this opening of an orientation that is at stake in Nancy’s critique of “clas-
sical” hermeneutics as well. However, his critique informs a reinterpretation of 
both hermeneutics and meaning.
1.3. Meaning versus Truth
Badiou’s dismissal of hermeneutics can also be found in his rejection of the no-
tions of meaning and interpretation (Badiou 1998, 54). An important example of 
this dismissal can be found in L’écriture du générique: Samuel Beckett (1992), 
where Badiou describes a development in Beckett’s work from interpretation to 
nomination, Badiou’s alternative to interpretation. This development concerns 
the possibility of addressing events in poetics. In works such as Watt, Badiou ar-
gues, Beckett does not arrive at addressing these events and incidents in an ade-
quate way since 
[L]es hypothèses sur les incidents restent captives d’une problématique de 
la signification. Nous sommes encore dans une tentative de type hermén-
eutique, où l’enjeu est, par une interprétation bien conduite, de raccorder 
l’incident à l’univers établi des significations. (Badiou 1992, 349)
In the transition from Watt to Fin de Partie, however, interpretation is replaced 
by nomination (Badiou 1992, 349-350). An interpretation is an effort to under-
stand an incident or an event, i.e., something utterly new in the situation, in terms 
of an already established universe of meaning. Due to this reattachment of the 
event to what is already given in a situation, the interpreter reduces and by that 
5 This discussion starts 
in Parmenides 163b. 
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reduction loses the event. That is to say, the interpreter does not preserve the 
supplementary character of the event with respect to the situation. This is why 
hermeneutics fails to do justice to events: an event interrupts the situation as 
well as the established universe of meaning.
This dismissal of hermeneutics mirrors Badiou’s remarks in L’être et 
l’événement. Also here, he distinguishes the notion of nomination from significa-
tion. What in Conditions is called the established universe of meaning, is called the 
language of the situation in L’être et l’événement. This language consists of names 
referring to entities (i.e., multiplicities) presented in the situation. Interpretation 
is for Badiou nothing but reducing the event to these names. Consequently, inter-
pretation cannot do justice to the supernumerary character of the event. By con-
trast, nomination is an intervention in the language of the situation that adds a 
name, namely the name of the event, to this language. This latter name has a pecu-
liar status: it is an empty name since it does not refer to an entity presented in the 
situation (Badiou 1988, 436-437). Yet, this simply means that nomination intro-
duces a new name opening up the possibility of a renewal of this language. 
This difference between interpretation and nomination returns in the dif-
ference between meaning and truth. For Badiou, truth should be carefully distin-
guished from meaning in the situation. In fact, he introduces a distinction between 
two attitudes or comportments towards the situation: knowing or understanding 
and fidelity. The first one is an attitude that only recognizes the meaningful lan-
guage of the situation and which is concerned with showing the «veridical» na-
ture of predicative statements concerning entities in 
the situation. 6 On the other hand, fidelity relates to 
the situation only in light of the event. This attitude 
originates from a decision: a nomination does not sim-
ply give a name to a pre-existing or pre-given event, it 
is rather a performative that decides that the event has taken place because the 
event itself does not exist. The subject that nominates the event is subsequently 
also the subject that decides, in the process of fidelity, which elements from the 
situation are and which are not related to the event. In Badiou’s terminology, truth 
is a generic set that consists of those elements of the situation which are positive-
ly connected to the event by means of the procedure of fidelity. 
The opposition between truth and meaning and between fidelity and 
knowledge stems from the duality of event and situation. In a certain sense, 
Badiou’s polemic with the poetic-hermeneutic strands of thought goes back to 
the question of whether the event has already taken place, to which Badiou’s 
declaration attests, or whether the event is still to come, which is a conviction 
shared by many philosophers of the poetic-hermeneutic strands of thought, 
keeping the attitude of fidelity in suspense. 7
2. Nancy’s Poetic-Hermeneutic
Account of Plurality as Partage
By bringing into play Nancy as a representative of po-
etic-hermeneutic thought, we will see that Badiou’s 
critique of poetic thought will change in its appear-
ance while a poetic conception of plurality takes 
shape. I will focus here mainly on Nancy’s Le part-
age des voix since the structure of this text beautifully fits with the discussion 
6 Badiou uses the term «verid-
ical» to indicate that a propo-
sition is true in the situation.
7 In a passage on this Heideggerian 
“a-venir interminable” in the work of 
Nancy, Badiou “malignantly”  
remarks: «On a envie de dire: 
“Écoutez, si cette pensée est en-
core tout entière à venir, reven-
ez nous voir quand au moins 
un morceau en sera venu!”» 
(Badiou 2004, 16). Cfr. also van 
der Heiden, The Scintillation of 
the Event (Badiou 2004, 102-105).
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so far. It consists of two parts. The first part develops a critique of “classical” her-
meneutics that in many respects runs parallel to Badiou’s, whereas the second 
part, drawing from Plato’s Ion, rethinks hermeneutics in relation to the activity 
of the poet as hermeneus. This latter part leads to Nancy’s conception of plural-
ity as partage.
2.1. Nancy’s Critique of “Classical” Hermeneutics
In the first part of Le partage des voix (1982), Nancy establishes a difference be-
tween two conceptions of hermeneutics exemplified by the work of Heidegger 
and Ricoeur, respectively. When we compare his comments on Ricoeur’s her-
meneutics with Badiou’s criticisms, we see the following striking resemblanc-
es. According to Nancy, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics departs from an «adhésion au 
sens», which means that meaning is a «pre-given» (pré-donné) of every inter-
pretation (Nancy 1982, 17-21). Hence, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics invokes a primor-
dial belonging to tradition which precedes every understanding or interpreta-
tion. In Nancy’s terms, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics invokes a “participation au sens.” 
Due to this participation, the pre-given meaning guides and orients from the 
outset every interpretation. However, this participation is simply presupposed 
and never explained or accounted for; it is a belief from which hermeneutics de-
parts without interrogation: «La croyance herméneutique en général n’est pas 
autre chose que cette présupposition» (Nancy 1982, 21). As a consequence, and 
unlike Heidegger, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics does not interrogate the very opening 
up of this orientation that enables interpretation. In his account of the notion of 
meaning, Nancy will stress that the French sens, which also means direction or 
orientation, should be understood as the process of opening up this orientation, 
as we shall see below. 
This criticism is clearly connected to Badiou’s critique of hermeneu-
tics as a practice that reattaches what it interprets to an established universe of 
meaning. In fact, it is also closely connected to Badiou’s critique of the dialectics 
that is involved in Ricoeur’s account of the conflict of interpretations. As Nancy 
argues in his reading of Ricoeur, the movement of interpretation presupposes a 
lost origin, but it presupposes it in such a way that interpretation already partic-
ipates in this origin and can, therefore, regain access to it (Nancy 1982, 18). This 
critique is almost verbatim the same as Badiou’s. For the latter, as we saw, the 
poetic-hermeneutic notion of withdrawal operates on the basis of a lost origin to 
which interpretation is still drawn and to which it can draw closer and closer in 
order to intuit again what it has lost, namely the pre-given meaning of being. For 
Nancy, this is just a description of Ricoeur’s account of the hermeneutic circle. 
At the same time, however, Nancy develops a conception of Heidegger’s 
hermeneutics that is not liable to this criticism. Although one might wonder 
whether he succeeds in this respect in his reading of Sein und Zeit, his effort in 
the second part to follow up on Heidegger’s suggestions from Unterwegs zur 
Sprache is definitely convincing.
The direction that the first part of Le partage des voix thus suggests 
is to found interpretation in a conception of hermeneutics and meaning (sens) 
that accounts for the disclosure of the space of meaning that is presupposed 
by every interpretation. Nancy describes this as follows: «L’ouverture de l’her-
meneuein est en ce sens ouverture du sens et au sens en tant qu’autre» (Nancy 
1982, 39). Although Nancy does not use the terminology of the new or of the 
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beginning here, the overture of meaning introduces a «sens en tant qu’autre.» 
This implies a rupture with any pre-given participation to meaning and an inter-
ruption of every already established universe of meaning. Badiou’s account of 
nomination aims to do something similar. Approached from Nancy’s angle, nom-
ination as proclamation or declaration turns out to be a poetic-hermeneutic cat-
egory that goes at the heart of the overture of meaning, especially when tak-
ing into account Nancy’s interpretation of hermeneutics in the second part of Le 
partage des voix.
2.2. Nancy’s Reinterpretation of Hermeneutics as Partage
Nancy interprets the hierarchy between a primordial overture of meaning and a 
secondary practice of interpretation in the terms proposed by Plato’s Ion. In this 
dialogue Socrates discusses with the rhapsode Ion what the characteristic activ-
ity of the poet and the rhapsode is. The term that characterizes both the poet and 
the rhapsode is «interpreter» (hermeneus): the poet interprets the god and the 
rhapsode interprets the poet. In this context, however, interpreting is not an in-
quiry into the meaning of the words that are being used. Quite the contrary, as 
Socrates indicates, both the poet and the rhapsode are out of their mind when 
they interpret. To interpret, hermeneuein, means first and foremost to lend a voice 
to the gods (in the case of the poet) or to recite the words of the poet (in the case 
of the rhapsode) without understanding. Both the poet and the rhapsode do so be-
cause they are driven by enthusiasm: a divine power (theia dunamis) works in and 
through them. Rather than communicating a pre-given meaning, they commu-
nicate this power and let their audiences share in this power. So the poet shares 
in a divine power and lets the rhapsode share in it, whereas the rhapsode, in turn, 
lets the audience share in it. It is this divine dispensation (theia moira) that Nancy 
translates as «partage divin» and which inspires his conception of partage. 
This brief summary of some elements Nancy draws from Plato’s dia-
logue already gives rise to a number of interesting issues in relation to Badiou. 
They all center around the concept of plurality that stems from it. 
(1) First of all, the poetic articulation is not the interpretation of a 
pre-given meaning. In fact, the poet’s interpreting lends a voice to the gods by 
means of the poet’s sharing in a divine force (theia dunamis) that accounts for 
the poet’s enthusiasm. What is crucial for Nancy’s understanding of this divine 
force is that it only works — and thus only is – in its transmission and communi-
cation. This means, in terms of Plato’s dialogue, that interpretation happens only 
in and through the sharing in and of the divine (partage divin). This implies that 
there is no separate unity of the divine force since it works only in and through 
a sharing. 8
It is the figure of the rhapsode that relates 
this sharing in an irreducible way to the issue of plu-
rality. Plato’s dialogue famously depicts the trans-
mission of the divine power by the image of iron 
rings that transmit the magnetic force by which they 
attract each other. The sharing of the divine power 
is only given in this plurality of rings, as Nancy indi-
cates by referring to the role played by the rhapsode 
in this dialogue: «D’une part, la force divine se trans-
met intacte — mais justement elle se transmet, et c’est avec le deuxième anneau 
8 The divine and the god itself is 
only this enthusiasm, that is, this 
sharing and division. Neither the 
divine nor the god itself is ever  
given in poetry as a unity. As  
Nancy (1982, 68) writes: «Le di-
vin est essentiellement partagé, 
donné, communiqué et partagé: 
c’est ce que signifie l’“en-thousi-
asme”. En ce sens, le divin, ou le 
dieu même, c’est l’enthousiasme».
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qu’elle manifeste pleinement cette propriété. La transmission exige la pluralité 
des anneaux […]» (Nancy 1982, 69). In this way, the notion of partage gives rise 
to a conception of plurality that cannot be reduced to a unity. The intact nature 
of the divine force consists in and exists as its multiple transmissions. 
When recalling Badiou’s critique of hermeneutics, we see two important 
elements arising in Nancy’s coining of partage. First of all, his account of being 
as partage or sharing in/sharing out stands in great contrast to Badiou’s account 
of being as l’impartageable. In discussion with Ricoeur, it is clear that Badiou’s 
emphasis on this latter notion can be understood as a critique of hermeneutics’ 
affirmation of unity over multiplicity. Nancy’s account of partage, however, pro-
poses a model of a sharing of being that does not reduce plurality to a plurality 
of interpretations as Ricoeur does, but accounts for being itself as plural. 
In the shift from Ricoeur to Nancy, we thus see another debate arising 
between Badiou’s mathematical and the poetic-hermeneutic strands of thought 
concerning conceptions of the plurality of being. Badiou’s account of multiplici-
ty arises on the basis of axiomatic decisions and because of that, the multiplic-
ity of mathematical orientations is based on a conflict concerning what counts 
and what does not count as being. Nancy’s account of plurality is not based on 
conflict but is derived from the following insight of Heidegger’s philosophy. As 
the latter notes in the Entwürfe zur Geschichte des Seins als Metaphysik (1998), 
the history of metaphysics interprets being as a being. That is, it deals with the 
question of that which all beings have in common (koinon) — namely being — 
as if this communality can be understood out of the oneness (hen) that char-
acterizes every being (Seiende). As Heidegger (1998, 417) writes, «Der Vorrang 
des Seienden legt das Sein als das koinon aus dem hen fest. Der auszeichnende 
Charakter der Metaphysik ist entschieden. Das Eine als die einigende Einheit 
wird maßgebend für die nachkommende Bestimmung des Seins». Interestingly 
enough, Badiou quotes this passage in order to indicate that only an ontology of 
multiplicities can overcome the problems to which Heidegger points in the his-
tory of metaphysics. Yet, in order to arrive at this conclusion, he interprets the 
quote as follows: «Ainsi, c’est parce que l’un décide normativement de l’être que 
l’être est réduit au commun, à la généralité vide, et doit endurer la prééminence 
métaphysique de l’étant» (Badiou 1998, 26). However, Heidegger does not write 
that being is reduced to the common. Rather, his quote indicates that the com-
mon is interpreted as oneness. This indication opens up another way of develop-
ing an ontology of plurality, namely along the lines of thought Nancy suggests. 
Nancy overcomes the metaphysical determination of the koinon out of the hen 
by means of the notion of partage since this notion gives a primordial status to 
the common without reducing it to the oneness of a being. Partage expresses 
exactly what beings have in common, share with each other, without reducing 
this sharing to a being. His account of the divine force that is only given in and as 
the enthusiasm shared by poets, rhapsodes and audience, beautifully illustrates 
that that which all these enthusiasts have in common is not one essence of en-
thusiasm. Rather, enthusiasm is the in-common of the gods, the poets, the rhap-
sodes and the audience: it is what they share in and as their differences. 
This difference between Badiou’s conflict and Nancy’s sharing is mir-
rored in another difference. In my description of the Badiou’s critique of herme-
neutics, the difference between mathematical and poetic-hermeneutic strands 
of thought concerned the direction and the orientation of thought: where po-
etic-hermeneutic thought longs for the lost origin, and thus wishes to return to 
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their provenance, mathematical thought moves forward by drawing the con-
sequences of its axiomatic decisions. However, Nancy’s account of partage is 
introduced in terms of communication and transmission. Clearly, this is not a 
movement back to the origin, but it is neither a form of drawing consequences. 
It presents us rather with a third alternative. The movement of sharing moves 
forward by a multiplication in a plurality of rings — the communication passes 
along poets, rhapsodes, listeners, and their differences. In this conception, the fu-
ture is not the future anterior of statements that will have become veridical, as 
Badiou argues, but it is multiplication by communication. Thus, for Nancy, com-
munication is never the process of sending and receiving a pre-given message, 
but as partage it is rather the very principle of multiplication by sharing. 
The difference between sharing and conflict thus also concerns a dif-
ference between two orientations towards the future, and one might even say 
between different conceptions of the event. For Badiou, the temporality of the 
future directs the militant fidelity to an event that has already taken place. For 
Nancy, on the other hand, the experience of plurality is opened up in and by the 
moment of communication, contact and contiguity of different beings that are-
in-common in that moment without fusing into one being. 
Thus, a completely different perspective on the relation of the subject, 
or the being that we are, to the beings around us arises from these two models 
of plurality. Badiou’s subject judges every being presented in the situation from 
the perspective of its connection (or not) to the event. Nancy’s subject, on the 
other hand, is the subject that experiences how it is different and plural itself by 
the different and plural ways it experiences its being-in-common with the beings 
it encounters.
The concepts of plurality and multiplicity developed by Nancy and 
Badiou thus part ways concerning the question of how thought touches (on) be-
ing. Nancy’s emphasis on contact and communication shows that the experience 
of being departs from the experience of the partage of being: being is given only 
as that which beings share — and which at the same time divides them as singu-
lar beings. The thought of being thus stems from a spatial configuration, name-
ly contiguity. By contrast, Badiou (1998, 96) claims that mathematical thought 
«touche à l’être». To touch (on) being means in this context to make contact in 
and as axiomatic decision and judgment on being. This latter element shows that 
it is not the koinon of being that is found in the thoughtful touch of mathematics 
but it rather founds the conflict with other conceptions of being. 
(2) Also in a second respect, the text of Nancy forms an intriguing point 
of departure to assess Badiou’s account of poetic-hermeneutic thought. As I 
noted in the introduction of this paper, Badiou characterizes these strands of 
thought by the suture of philosophy to poetics. Le partage des voix provides us 
with an extreme version of this suture when it describes the genre of poetics. 
The plurality to which the partage divin gives rise is reflected in the genre of po-
etics. Every poet is inspired by the muses but he always speaks only in one style 
as Socrates notes. Although all the poets share their enthusiasm, they are each 
inspired differently. Consequently, the poetic genre in general is never and no-
where expressed or announced. It is only announced in the plurality of its differ-
ent poetic articulations and poetic styles. As Nancy (1982, 66) writes:
Il y a donc un partage, une différence originaire des genres ou des voix 
poétiques — et peut-être, en sous-main, un partage des genres poétique 
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et philosophique. Il n’y a pas de poésie générale, et quant à la poiétique 
générale dont on a par principe admis l’existence, elle restera introuvable: 
mais c’est ici bien sûr qu’elle s’expose. Il n’y a que des voix singulières, con-
trastées, et l’enthousiasme est avant tout l’entrée dans une telle singularité.
Nancy’s idea of being as a singular plural is anticipated in this description of the 
poetic genre which is only given in its singular and plural interpretations by mul-
tiple poets. This ultimately justifies the claim that Nancy’s conception of plurali-
ty as partage is a poetic-hermeneutic conception. 
Moreover, the above quote testifies to a suture of philosophy to poetics 
in the strongest sense possible when it suggests «un partage des genres poé-
tiques et philosophiques». Apparently, the plurality of poetic genres comprises 
the plurality of philosophical genres. Nancy elaborates this suggestion later in 
the text when he discusses the main characteristic of the philosophical genre 
that speaks out of Socrates’ comments: it is the task of philosophy to master the 
truth of the other genres (in this case the poetic and rhapsodic genre). Yet, ac-
cording to Nancy, two difficulties arise in this Socratic conviction. 
First, the truth of poetic discourse is the enthusiasm and the magnet-
ic force on which it depends. These characteristics are exactly that which can-
not be mastered. In this sense, as Nancy notes, the philosopher masters only that 
it cannot master poetic discourse: «Maîtriser l’immaîtrisable […] fait l’enjeu et le 
jeu le plus savant du philosophe» (Nancy 1982, 78). 
Secondly, Nancy notes that in order for Socrates to master the poetic 
discourses he adopts the voice of the rhapsode Ion and becomes an interpreter 
of Homer. This means that in order to master the other discourses, the philoso-
pher plays the role of the philosopher, the rhapsode and the poet. Thus he stages 
the dialogue, as Nancy (1982, 78) writes: 
Pour le construire, cependant, il aura fallu mettre en scène, prendre des rôles,  
interpréter le rhapsode et réciter Homère, dédoubler le philosophe, inter-
préter la philosophie. Il aura fallu écrire, choisir un genre (un genre de mi-
mesis), composer le dialogue. L’hermeneia du dialogue déborde irrésistible- 
ment la maîtrise que le dialogue pense et présente, et qui est la maîtrise du 
procédé herméneutique.
This staging of the dialogue at the heart of the philosophical effort to master 
the genres of the poet and the rhapsode is itself a hermeneutic enterprise. This 
is the reason why, ultimately, there is indeed a partage of philosophy and poet-
ics. What they share is the activity of the interpreter of which the dialogue tes-
tifies that it cannot be mastered. (Let me emphasize once more that interpreting 
means first and foremost articulating, staging, and announcing — and not finding 
a pre-given meaning). 
In this context, Plato plays an even more significant role than Socrates 
because he stages, as writer of the dialogue, all the characters. Plato is le part-
age des voix, the sharing and the plurality of all the voices that are staged in this 
dialogue. Unlike dialectics, which aims to reconcile different, conflicting voic-
es and interpretations, the «dialogicity» (dialogicité) that according to Nancy 
speaks from Plato’s dialogues is rather a sharing of voices (partage des voix) in 
and as communication. Plurality as partage thus suggests a scene of multiple 
and perhaps even conflicting voices and interpretations that does not privilege 
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the one over the many but discerns in communication the principle of multipli-
cation and differentiation itself. 
3. Decision and Communication: On a Twofold Heritage of Plato 
What has become of the conflict between mathematical and poetic thought that 
Badiou stages in L’être et l’événement as well as other texts? It is clear that his 
conception of poetic-hermeneutic thought is marked by a number of character-
istics that belong to “classical” hermeneutics alone. By choosing his adversar-
ies in this way, Badiou’s critique of poetic-hermeneutic thought tends to avoid 
a confrontation with strands of this thought that develop a genuine alternative 
ontology of plurality along poetic-hermeneutic lines of thought. The comparison 
with Nancy indicated the following: (1) Nancy’s poetic-hermeneutic approach 
develops a similar critique of “classical” hermeneutics as Badiou does. (2) As a 
consequence, certain poetic-hermeneutic remainders in Badiou’s work remain 
unthought. His account of nomination as disclosing a new realm of meaning is 
similar to the poetic-hermeneutic discussion of the primordial meaning of her-
meneutics as announcement. (3) Finally, the confrontation with the ontology of 
plurality Nancy develops, indicates that there are indeed a number of serious dif-
ferences between mathematical and poetic-hermeneutic thought. 
Perhaps the most fundamental difference concerns the question what 
counts as plurality. Here, the issue concerns the question of how thought touch-
es (on) being and how it discloses a new discourse on being: Is this discourse 
opened up by an axiomatic decision or is it opened up by the experience of the 
partage in the encounter of multiple beings? Does thought touch (on) being by 
decision or by communication?
To indicate how these two determinations of thought are connect-
ed, let me finish this comparison with a brief note on one strange similarity be-
tween Badiou’s mathematical and Nancy’s poetic-hermeneutic orientation: their 
shared platonic background. Badiou argues that the distinction between the po-
etic and mathematical orientation of philosophy concerns a distinction between 
the pre-platonic poem and the platonic matheme (Badiou 1988, 143). This is why 
Badiou calls himself a Platonist. To some extent, this is understandable. The em-
phasis on the matheme to characterize Plato’s thought has a long history and 
is also clearly present in Heidegger’s assessment of Plato and his subsequent 
dismissal of Plato as the philosopher inaugurating the history of metaphysics. 
Badiou returns to Plato the mathematician and the metaphysician, albeit this 
time the metaphysician of plurality. 9
However, Badiou’s claim that the poet-
ic orientation of philosophy is pre-platonic is put to 
the test by Nancy’s reading of the Ion. Le partage des 
voix shows that the poetic-hermeneutic account of 
plurality as partage has its roots in the platonic text 
itself. Hence, both the mathematical and the poet-
ic-hermeneutic reappraisal of plurality is inspired by Plato’s dialogues: the ear-
ly dialogue Ion accounts for interpretation in terms of a sharing in the divine 
force; the later dialogue Parmenides draws the consequences from the hypoth-
esis that the one is not. It is in this sense that both contemporary philosophies 
are platonic.
Of course, this latter characterization — “platonic” — is ambiguous and 
9 In addition, his explorations of 
the difference between Plato’s 
and Aristotle’s conception of the 
ontological status of mathemat-
ics deepen his platonic conviction, 
cfr. Badiou (1998, 39-59 and 95-118).
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depends on which Plato one highlights: Plato the mathematician or Plato the 
writer of dialogues; Plato describing being as multiple following the hypothesis 
“the one is not” in the Parmenides or Plato staging and interpreting the voices of 
all his characters in the Ion. Moreover, when looking more closely, it turns out 
that the Plato’s that are presented here are in both cases at best partial Plato’s. 
Badiou rejects Plato’s remark that philosophy, unlike mathematics, does not de-
part from a hypothesis or an axiom but rather aims to find the first principle and 
true point of departure (arche). 10 Especially in light 
of the Parmenides this is a crucial rejection: by tak-
ing the hypothesis as axiomatic point of departure 
rather than as something that needs to be left behind in order to reach the true 
beginning, Badiou does not discuss the rest of the Parmenides. From other pas-
sages, it is clear that this dialogue develops a dialectical method that does not 
only draw the consequences of a given hypothesis but also of its negation, as 
Parmenides remarks: «You must not only consider what happens if a particular 
hypothesis is true, but also what happens if it is not true» (Parmenides, 136a; 
translation taken from the Loeb-edition). Nancy’s Plato, on the other hand, places 
us from the outset in the position of being abandoned from understanding. Yet, 
does not such an emphasis on abandonment neglect the importance of under-
standing in a platonic framework? 11
Plato, thus, inspires ontologies of plurality 
but he does so for readers who affirm only certain di-
mensions of his work while forgetting or even reject-
ing others. To a certain extent, this need not surprise 
us since this is the typical relation one has to a her-
itage. This relation always combines the necessity of decision and communica-
tion. With respect to what is handed down, one has to decide what one affirms; it 
is exactly in and through this decision that the com-
munication of tradition takes place. 12 Given the pos-
sibility of multiple decisions and plural affirmations, 
it is this combination of decision and communication, decision as communica-
tion, and communication as decision that forms the heart of every pluralization 
of any heritage. It is therefore, perhaps, not too surprising that the heritage of 
Plato for ontologies of plurality bifurcates exactly in this twofold way of thought 
touching (on) being: as decision and as communication. 
10 Cfr. Badiou (1998, 32-33).
11 A more elaborate account of 
the problems arising here are 
discussed in van der Heiden 
(2014), Chapter 3, as well as in 
van der Heiden (2015a, 195-209).
12 Cfr. Derrida 1993, 40.
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